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New “cold” winds seem to come back in international relations 
(Baker, 2014). Because of the events of Ukraine, relations between 
the United States (US) and Russia have been rapidly deteriorating. A 
new, modern, American containment policy against Moscow, based 
on economic sanctions, now affects the relations between West and 
Moscow. Economic sanctions ordered by Washington supported by its 
Western allies, Brussels and the European Member States (MS), since 
March 2014 (CCTV America, 2014). A framework that seems to find its 
explanation in what has been called “Cold War logic”. 
Is a new Cold War just a media fascination? In fact, the return of this 
logic seems to be an indisputable fact of contemporary international 
relations, at least between Washington and Moscow. Although there 
is no longer a bipolar division in two spheres of influence, US-Russia 
relations still have implications that go beyond the interests of their 
respective nations. For example, the lack of Russian support for the 
United Nations’ (UN) intervention in Syria, by its veto in the Security 
Council, is emblematic. Although downgraded by the super power 
rate, Moscow is demonstrating that it never buried the rivalry that 
characterized East-West relations during the Cold War years. In other 
words, it still opposes itself to the spread of what is perceived as the 
liberal order promotion by Washington and Bruxelles. Exacerbated by 
the “question Ukraine”, this antagonism is still able of having global 
influences within international politics (Buras et al., 2014). 
The debate between rationalists and constructivists has gained 
new vigour over the reasons linked to this renewed antagonism. 
Realists claim that the opposition between Vladimir Putin on the one 
hand, and Barack Obama, Angela Merkel and François Hollande on 
Table of contents
Abstract ...........................................................................................      5
Theory of international rivalry ........................................................     9
 Enduring rivalry .......................................................................   10
 Strategic rivalry .......................................................................   10
Cognitive approach between psychology and “folk psychology”....    14
Theory of mimetic desire ...............................................................   19
 Mimesis, violence and conflict. Construction of 
 a model of analysis ..................................................................   21
Operationalization of the mimetic rivalry model ...........................   30
Origins of the cold war ....................................................................   32
 US - USSR: destined to collide? ................................................   32
 FDR and Stalin: pragmatic cooperation with the “evil” ..........   37
 Outbreak of the rivalry – Truman’s administration .................   40
Conclusions .....................................................................................   47
Bibliography ....................................................................................   50














































































7In order to investigate the dynamics that led to the emergence 
of an ideological confrontation between US-Russia, this paper 
suggests a new model of analysis of international rivalry, based on 
a cognitive approach to international relations (IR) as well as an 
individual level of analysis. This paper’s goal is to investigate the 
origins of the Cold War providing a better understanding on the 
emergence of those dynamics. The expected results are new useful 
insights to understand in depth the reasons for the US-Russia 
contemporary tough confrontation. The question that this paper 
seeks to answer are: is the Cold War a unique and unrepeatable 
moment in the history of international relations? If not, can it re-
emerge, in different ways, driven by certain dynamics? 
The first part of this paper is based on the theoretical analysis 
of US-Soviet Union (URSS) rivalry.2 Their relations will be analysed 
from the theoretical perspective. In particular, it will be offered a 
brief summary of the approaches used to understand international 
rivalry. Furthermore, a critique of these approaches will be offered. 
This critique has a twofold implication. On the one hand, it highlights 
how the various rivalry definitions proposed have strong explanatory 
limits due to the lack of understanding on those factors triggering the 
rivalry itself, before an open conflict occurs. Additionally, it stresses 
out the need for a cognitive-psychological approach to churn out a 
new definition of rivalry as well as a model of analysis provided with 
explanatory and predictive abilities to grasp the emergence-phase of 
an international rivalry. 
In the second part, a new model of international rivalry 
analysis, based on a cognitive approach, will be designed. The 
aim is to provide a deeper understanding of how decision-makers 
grasp the surrounding environment, that is, how they internalize, 
interpret and react by external stimuli. A new definition of rivalry 
will be proposed, in order to identify those dynamics and factors 
that lie under the rivalry emergence, taking into account the 
political, economic and psychological dimensions of dyad inner 
relations. This new definition of rivalry, called mimetic rivalry, will 
2 Precisely because of the suddenness of the end of the Cold War, in fact, the study 
of international rivalry took place as an innovative and revolutionary model of conflict 
analysis. (Thompson, 1995: 1).
the other, on the fate of Ukraine, has a solid rational basis. Firstly, 
because Washington, Brussels (Paris and Berlin) and NATO have 
sought to expand their influence in Eastern Europe and wrest the 
control of Ukraine from Russia. In return, Moscow has responded 
by defending its vital national security interest, occupying Crimea 
and trying to annex the eastern part of Ukraine. These divergent 
interests, plus the West indirect intervention in the conflict – sending 
weapons to the Ukrainian government – has created a military 
escalation that led to the current situation. It was not an ideological 
confrontation, but a divergence of power interests that has led to a 
military escalation because it encompassed a vital national security 
interest of the Russians. 
Constructivists argue that this thesis is full of contradictions. 
According to them, in fact, realists’ argument does not explain the 
absence of any empirical evidence about Western strategic interest 
above Ukraine since its “birth” in 1991. Secondly, given that NATO 
is only a “paper tiger” now,1 Moscow’s perceptions and reactions 
against NATO’s influence in Ukraine cannot be explained by logics of 
power. Thirdly, from a geopolitical point of view, Russian’s interest 
for Ukraine cannot be explained by avoiding any cultural, religious 
and historical factor. Moreover, the fear of further disproportional 
military escalation by Moscow – which often has driven the adoption 
of new sanctions – it is based on pseudo-psychological analysis of 
Putin’s way of thinking (Motyl, 2015).
According to this paper, the debate between realists and 
constructivists is misleading. In fact, if there is no doubt that Ukraine has 
acquired a greater symbolic value than its intrinsic real value. It is also 
true that the actors involved take their decisions based on this altered 
perception of reality and, because of that, according to their points of 
view, their actions are very rational. Then, according to this paper, the 
right answer is the third. It is the rivalry, still present between the two 
powers, which has altered their perceptions of reality, leading them to 
consider rational what actually did not appear. Thus, the ideological 
aspect of the conflict would be an endogenous product of US-Russia 
rivalry. A latent rivalry that would result every time one of the actors’ 
behaviour is driven by a particular desire. 















































































Theory of international rivalry
The international rivalry debate is not green. One of the first cases 
analysed was the Cold War, as the result of the Soviet-American rivalry. 
However, instead of being focused on beginning, escalation, and the 
end of the Cold War, the scholars were focused on the reason of the 
old models’ fiasco in predicting its end. Nevertheless, the literature 
on international rivalry has grown, more and more away, producing 
abstract models strongly linked to the extreme form of international 
conflict: the war.
The growing interest in this new model of IR analysis is based on 
an empirical evidence: war occurrence is not independent by the 
historical background of the dyad. This implies the need of looking at 
the whole range of - cooperative and competitive – relations that take 
place within it. Furthermore, this implies that conflicts outbreak is not 
a phenomenon that occurs between two independent actors. Instead, 
the historical context influence the result of the dyad. In other words, 
this approach takes into account time as a key factor to understand the 
causes that drive decision-makers’ foreign policy decisions to make 
war or not (Crescenzi & Enterline, 2001).
Therefore, if violence as well as solidarity between rivals shape 
and influence their “historical mnemonic” baggage, this implies the 
need to sort the contents of that baggage out before diverging the 
focus on the conflict outbreak contingent reasons. Indeed, because of 
that historical and psychological baggage, the relations between two 
rivals present peculiar dynamics. These relations can result in “special 
friendships” or “special competitions”. In the first case, actors find 
easier to solve peacefully the crises among each other, while, special 
competitors dyads are characterized by higher frequencies of armed 
be based on René Girard’s3 theory of mimetic desire application 
to international politics.
In the third part, the mimetic rivalry model will be used to identify 
three phases of US-URSS emergence of rivalry. Firstly, the relations 
between Washington and Moscow at the ending of WWI, during the 
years of a new world order reconstruction, will be re-framed. Secondly, 
the post-WWII period will be analysed. Particular attention will be 
driven to the peace conferences, held by Allies, with the aim to define 
the new structure of the post-WWII world order. Finally, this chapter 
will focus on the stage that preceded and led to the Cold War formal 
outbreak: the Korean War. 
In conclusion, we will try to answer the following questions: are 
we facing a new - potential - “Cold War” between Washington and 
Moscow? Is the Cold War a unique and unrepeatable moment in the 
IR history? Can Cold War re-emerges in different ways, though? 
The hypothesis advanced by this paper is that the constructivist 
and realist arguments are flawed because they cannot provide a 
full understanding of those dynamics that lie under US-URSS rivalry 
emergence. The reason is due to their strict linkage with the actors’ 
altered point of view within the rivalry. In fact, rivalry traces are to be 
found elsewhere, namely in the mimetic origins of actors’ ideological 
behaviour.
3 René Girard’s thought defies classification. He has written from the perspective of 
a wide variety of disciplines, namely Literary Criticism, Psychology, Anthropology, 
Sociology, History, Biblical Hermeneutics and Theology. Although he rarely calls himself 
a philosopher, many philosophical implications can be derived from his work. Girard’s 
work is above all concerned with Philosophical Anthropology (that is, ‘What is it to 
be human?’), and draws from many disciplinary perspectives. Over the years, he has 
developed a mimetic theory. According to this theory, human beings imitate each other, 
and this eventually gives rise to rivalries and violent conflicts. Such conflicts are partially 
solved by a scapegoat mechanism, but ultimately, Christianity is the best antidote to 














































































11has occurred (Thompson, 2002: 201). The further approaches 
increasingly moved the focus away from military disputes frequency 
ratings (Bennet 1997; Maoz & More 2002; Klein at al 2006), to shift the 
focus over the ways whereby decision-makers’ perceptions influence 
the outcome of the dyad, rather (Thompson, 2001, 2002; Colaresi 
et al., 2007; Mitchell & Thies 2011). In other words, starting from 
quantitative-based approaches, the research has moved more a more 
close over qualitative-based approaches – based on interpretations 
than calculations (Thompson, 2001). 
Strategic rivalry, defines those dyads in which actors’ relation is 
characterized by a “special competition”. In particular, this competition 
emerges when actors perceive each other as: (a) competitors, (b) actual 
or latent threat likely to trigger a militarized conflict, and (c) enemies 
(2001: 560). Then, according to this approach, at the beginning of the 
rivalry there is a selective-phase. This means that each actor chose 
its rival on the base of those three perceptions. This implies that an 
asymmetry in military capabilities does not preclude to a rivalry, as 
it was for the enduring rivalry approach. Since the rivalry outbreak is 
based on states’ perceptions, rivalry can occur even between weak-
strong states, though it would lead to different results (Thies, 2001).4 
Ultimately, this approach is very similar to a socio-psychological 
process,5 which mainly focuses its attention on how actors’ negative 
perceptions lead dyads relations into a zero-sum game situation, that 
is, the stage immediately before the first MID outbreak.
Nevertheless, even this approach has its limits to shed new light on 
the rivalry emergence. Indeed, if its aim is to improve the explanatory 
skill of a rivalry-based analysis of international conflicts, it still has 
some lacks. Firstly, since the emergence of a strategic rivalry is based 
on decision-makers’ public statements, this approach does not provide 
any predictive tool to understand the emergence of a rivalry before it 
becomes overt. Secondly, its explanatory power is flawed because an 
4 However, what most influences the decision-maker is the perception to deal with a 
state “plays in the same league.” Because his approach its base on perception, according 
to Thompson, this does not preclude a competition between a stronger and weaker 
states. Nevertheless, it is more likely that an armed conflict emerges between actors 
with similar military capabilities, and not vice versa (Thompson, 2001: 560). 5 Rather than a definition closely linked to frequency of conflicts and symmetry of 
military capabilities. 
conflict occurrence (Colaresi & Thompson, 2002). In other words, once 
dyads get into a spiral of violence, the more it escalates and the more 
actors’ relations exacerbate, up to the conflict and war. 
Enduring rivalry 
The first approach emerged in the literature was the “enduring 
rivalry” (Diehl, 1985). This approach provides a rivalry definition 
closely linked to the conflict, since the existence of an enduring rivalry 
is determined by the frequency of the armed conflict within a dyad. 
In particular, it emerges when a dyad does experience at least three 
armed conflicts – “militarized interstate disputes” (MID) - over fifteen 
years. In order to continue over time, the rivalry must experiences 
at least a military conflict within a period of fifteen years since last 
MID (Diehl, 1985: 1,204). A highly arbitrary definition of rivalry, 
then, because it focuses its attention only in numbers, duration, and 
frequency of disputes. 
Therefore, the dynamics that lead to the emergence of a rivalry are 
not addressed (Huddleston, 4). This approach can only highlight the 
presence of an international rivalry when it has already escalated into 
a military conflict. In other words, this approach has only a descriptive 
ability to recognize those rivalries that already show the worst result 
of the rivalry itself. Then, the explanatory and predictive abilities of 
an international rivalry approach are not fully developed, (Thompson, 
2002). This approach does not address that set of behaviours that have 
led both states to a stage where the violent resolution of the conflict 
is seen as the only available alternative. As a result, it does not analyse 
the psychological and historical baggage that affects decision-makers’ 
decisions and, in this way, influences the actors’ foreign policies.  
Strategic rivalry
 
For this reason, the debate continued towards a broader 
conceptualization of the rivalry definition, trying to provide a deeper 














































































13equals ... In the pursuit of these aims, the United States and other 
likeminded nations find themselves directly opposed by a regime with 
contrary aims and a totally different concept of life” (Truman, 1989). 
However, this Truman’s statement, recorded in history as the 
Truman Doctrine, was uttered overtly only in 1947, not before. In fact, 
before FDR’s death, it can be said US-URSS relations were better than 
those with London.7 Indeed, in 1945, US administration was primarily 
concentrated in defeating its truly rival, because of which it had gone to 
war: Japan. Yet, the very first act of Truman’s international policy was the 
nuclear ending of US-Japan war, obtained with Tokyo’s unconditional 
surrender. A decision in continuity with FDR’s administration, which 
had secretly approved and funded the Manhattan project. 
These historical details, however, are not given to delay the formal 
beginning of the rivalry between USSR and US. Rather, this paper, 
aiming to investigate the emergence of the American-Soviet rivalry, 
argues the need of further deeper analysis on those dynamics that 
shaped the historical and psychological baggage, which has led to the 
emergence of the rivalry. Through the approached outlined before, it 
is hard to move away from a simplistic description of the rivalry as an 
ideological confrontation. However, the Communist ideology was not 
different before FDR’s death. Truman’s administration, differently from 
its forerunner, simply chose to evaluate URSS existence as naturally 
antithetic to the US. Where this huge difference came from? A deeper 
psychological-cognitive investigation is needful.
7 An attitude evident within the conferences held by the Allies to determine the future 
world order. In any case, the subject will be addressed in the third chapter. 
overt declaration of rivalry, that is, the beginning of a strategic rivalry, 
can be a product of the rivalry itself. By that moment, indeed, one actor 
publicly states to perceiving another actor as its ultimate enemy, that 
is, a vital threat to its welfare.6 Then, if the beginning of the strategic 
rivalry can be considered as a product of the rivalry itself (Huddleston, 
6), this means that the overt rivalry declaration is only a finale stage 
of an escalation process. In other words, it is needful to address those 
dynamics that lead the actors to perceive each other as dangerous 
enemies, instead of fair competitors. 
In sum, the existing approaches seem to be unable to go beyond 
the mere identification of an already broken out rivalry, yet. Thus, the 
predictive ability of international rivalries models have not yet been 
truly exploited. On the one hand, the model of “enduring rivalry”, 
as well as those based on quantitative-based approaches, does not 
analyse the rivals’ relations before three military disputes’ outbreak 
have occurred. On the other hand, the “strategic rivalries” model, 
yet too much linked to issues of strategic security, fails to grasp those 
economic, geopolitical and diplomatic dynamics that concur to form 
the psychological and historical baggage of a nation. Thus, it does 
not provide any further understanding about how decision-makers’ 
perceptions, shaped but the psychological and historical baggage, 
emerges. The outbreak of a strategic rivalry seems to be the culmination 
of another process, yet hidden, that concurs to worsening decision-
makers’ perceptions and, thus, the foreign policy of each actor. 
For example, the Cold War, that is the beginning of the US-URSS 
strategic rivalry is dated in 1945, while its end in 1989 (Thompson, 
2001: 573). This categorization would correspond to the US President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) death, and the sixties years old 
Henry S. Truman designation of new US President, who, after being 
unexpectedly elected, addressed the Senate stating that “the actions 
resulting from the Communist philosophy are a threat to the efforts of 
free nations to bring about world recovery and lasting peace. [While] 
“our people desire are determined to work for peace on earth – a just 
and lasting peace – based on genuine agreements freely arrived by 
6 When a decision-maker make the rivalry public, he is claiming to be in a relationship 
of special competition with an actor considered as it bitter enemy, since that statement 
pose serious consequences among the relations between the two states. The other actor, 














































































15are flawed. It means losing a large part of the explanation of the 
foreign policy determinants. 
Addressing the cognitive aspect of a foreign policy means 
addressing the realists and constructivists debate over rationality. 
On the one hand, realists dealt with decision-makers and states as 
a mere “black-box”, because they look for few key objectives and 
interests under the pressure of determining systemic forces (Waltz, 
2010). On the other hand, constructivists’ arguments, despite they 
take into account more variables such as identity and social forces, 
they have failed to open that “black box”: humans’ mind. Through 
a cognitive approach, this paper aims to examine decision-makers’ 
perceptions formation. In other words, it aims to understand those 
mechanisms by which internal and external stimuli are converted, 
that is, turned in external action. 
The need for a cognitive approach of international politics is urgent. 
Indeed, although their presence dominate the works of the most 
important IR analysis, the influence of cognitive factors such as ideas, 
opinions, perceptions and identity is weighted without dealing with 
their psychological dimension (Goldgeier, 1997: 145).10 Due to this lack, 
any effort to design a conflict model of analysis with both explanatory 
and predictive power are flawed (Ibid. 139). Although some scholars 
remain sceptical about the use of this dimension of analysis,11 this 
scepticism does not take into account the scientific advances and new 
discoveries made today in the scientific field (Garrels, 2006). However, 
another school of thought simply chooses of not analysing the 
human mind’s role behind his behaviour, preferring to explain human 
behaviour through arbitrary diagnoses. 
Most scholars believe that human leanings are cognitive distortions, 
that is, a factor that negatively affects human decision, which would be 
logical and rational, otherwise. A belief that is substantially shared by 
the constructivists. Indeed, despite the increased complexity through 
10 Even realists describe the behaviour of an individual as looking for “reasons to act”, 
i.e. security, honour, freedom, competition and self-interest. 
11 Morgenthau’s thought, still influent today, is a good example. He says that it is 
useless to investigate the thinking of decision-makers because it would be a waste of 
time. Another example, St. Augustine would conclude his thought by stating that the 
futility is due to the complexity of human thought, or rather to too much complexity 
(Mercer, 2005).
 
Cognitive approach between psychology and “folk 
psychology”
In order to investigate those dynamics that led to the overt declaration 
of URSS-US rivalry, this paper provides a model of international rivalry 
analysis based on a cognitive approach to international politics.8 
Indeed, the Cold War cannot be explained without addressing the 
“Truman factor” as well as that of other representatives close to him, 
such as George Kennan, who played a significant role in the sudden 
change of relationships between USSR and US, starting from the early 
months following the end of World War II.9 
The cognitive approach is chosen because even the Holocaust 
cannot be explained without investigating the role of Hitler. The 
values of anti-Semitic Hitler as well as those of ordinary Germans, 
flanked by their cognitive orientations are key variables to explain 
how they have been transformed into performers and volunteers 
aware of the Nazi expansionism policies (Rose, 2000; Goldhagen, 
1995). In other words, this paper wants to highlight that behind 
the policies of a nation, there are individuals, called decision-
makers. They are the material performers of nations’ foreign 
policies. Any analysis of a foreign policy that does not take into 
account the cognitive aspect of who takes in place those policies 
8 The cognitive approach, as an approach of political psychology, has born from “the 
application of the human psychology to the study of the policies” (Huddy et al., 2013: 2). 
In particular, it applies the discoveries related to human cognitive system to explain the 
behaviour of individuals within a specific political system. Although, political psychology 
“alone cannot explain the Holocaust, wars and conflicts” (Huddy et al., 2013: 4), its role 
cannot even be “minimized or ignored” (Rosati, 2000: 2). 
9 Here the reference is to the famous telegram sent by the Secretary of State Marshall 














































































17emotions and cognitive inclinations to define a rational way of 
behaving – and constructivist-psychologists – who use psychology only 
to explain human error - agree in believing mind as a source of negative 
influences over human process of ideas, opinions, perceptions and 
rational behaviours. 
This paradox has created bizarre consequences. Firstly, according to 
this axiom, “rationality is not based on the psychology” (Mercer, 2005: 
3). Since psychology explains mental phenomena, and since mind is a 
source of errors, then, rational behaviour is not based on psychology 
or on mind because it produces right results. For example, according 
this thesis, political psychology can only explain why an individual, 
because of certain emotions, does not behave as the model of rational 
choice would impose to behave. In that case, and only in that case, 
the use of psychological models is accepted as useful.15 However, this 
example brings us to another bizarre consequence of a “rationality free 
from psychology: scholars may know what is rational, in psychology, 
only after establishing what is rational “(Mercer, 2005: 4), a sort of 
arbitrary rationality threshold. Evidently, the paradox represents the 
use of typically psychological concepts as honour, security, freedom, 
and confidence without any linkage to the psychological dimension 
because the latter is only useful to understand deviate behaviours. 
Furthermore, if rationality explains right behaviours, this means 
that psychology cannot explain accurate judgments (Mercer, 2005: 4). 
Paradoxically, when they are driven by their mind, individuals are brought 
to error. Then, this axiom, based on a rationality that lacks of a psychological 
dimension, is clearly irrational. In fact, it is not possible to divide human 
mind and rationality when it comes to analyse how individuals grasp 
their surrounding environment as well as how they behave. In order to 
investigate individuals’ behaviour a deeper understanding on how human 
mind behaves, how individuals process the environmental stimuli, how 
they human mind’s mechanisms work is needful. 
15 Approach similar to that of Crescenzi and Enterline (2001) explained above. The 
system of thought focused on realpolitik, limits the ability of policymakers to be able 
to give the right value to the information they possess. In other words, for scholars, 
the agreement would always be possible, if do not intervene cognitive distortions that 
make the actors irrational. According to this paper, however, it is this evaluation that 
prevents an agreement. A superficial assessment, which is based on the behaviour of the 
adversary, without going into a deeper analysis of the cognitive process that led to that 
decision. 
which they describe human behavior,12 they assume, as realists do, 
that, ultimately, human behaviour is rational.13 Even the international 
rivalries models, from the simplest to the most complex, are based on this 
assumption: they assume that actors would be able to resolve peacefully 
any conflict if that historical and psychological baggage did not influence 
their rationality. In other words, the historical and psychological baggage 
turns decision-makers and states in irrational actors. 
Contrary to the cognitive approach, the former approaches focus 
their attention on preferences and results, while the cognitive approach 
“tends to focus on opinions and process as well as on how preferences 
are formed and where they come from among the decision-makers” 
(Rose, 2000: 6). In other words, the cognitive approach, unlike the 
others, analyses how human mind works, or how individuals, through 
specific mental processes, form their own opinions. Rather than 
speculate normative way of behave, the cognitive approach only 
focuses on how thought is formed, without labelling it a priori as 
rational or irrational.14 
Although some models pretend to address conflict psychological 
dimensions, they use psychological factors to explain “deviant” 
behaviours, that is, those behaviours that deviate from rationality 
(Mercer, 2005: 3). A real paradox because if political psychology helps 
to explain human mind’s influence over decision-makers’ behaviour, 
those models implicitly assume that, “when human mind does act”, 
it deviates individual’s behaviour from rational to irrational outcomes. 
(Mercer, 2005). Thus, paradoxically, both rationalists - who discard 
12 If the realists’ claim that the actor is rational because pursues its own interest, 
constructivists integrate this statement by analysing how people’s preferences are 
influenced by internal and external forces, taking into account not only economic 
interests but also perceptions. For example, a state may distort the information it makes 
publicly available, in order to obtain more benefits (Enterline & Crescenzi, 2001: 655), 
or the lack of confidence in the actions between two states, could lead to conflict even if 
they knew all the information to resolve the dispute peacefully (Enterline & Crescenzi, 
2001: 656). 
13 The rational paradigm is bases on the assumption that the war is never the first 
preference of the actor since it represents a burdensome and reliable cost, and its benefit 
are likely and uncertain. Thus, if they had the chance they would prefer to invest their 
resources in a peaceful and satisfactory agreement, rather than in a war (Fearon, 1995). 
14 If the rational approach defines what is an accurate judgment, that is an argument 
that is based on a rational process, cognitive approaches, such as the theory of 
correspondence approach theory highlights how individuals adopt a decision, regardless 















































































Theory of mimetic desire
Therefore, how does this learning process work? How do people 
formulate their desires? A theory that tries to solve this puzzle is René 
Girard’s theory of Mimetic Desire. According to Girard (1996), “there is 
almost nothing, in human behaviour, it is not learned, and all learning 
is reduced to imitation. If men suddenly ceased to imitate, all cultural 
forms vanish “(22). In other words, mimesis and mimetic mechanisms 
are the core of human relations and every learning process are based 
on mimesis.18 
However, Girard does not intend mimesis as the human ability to copy 
a gesture of his similar. According to Girard, through human mimesis, 
people are able of inference and appropriation, that is, they are able 
to grasp the goal – or desire – behind another person’s behaviour and, 
ultimately, to copy that desire. Thus, through human imitation, people 
learn how to desire making inference and internalizing other people 
desires.19 Girard calls this ability the acquisitive dimension of human 
imitation. In this way, people desire what other people desire. This 
makes human desire no more an original individual product but social 
product, that is, desires result from individuals’ interactions. However, 
as it will be stressed out later, human mimesis also represents the root 
of the “slavery of mankind,” that is, the need to “prevent conflicts 
inevitably caused by the convergence towards the same object, two 
or more equally greedy hands” (Girard, 1996: 23). Stripped of its 
18 According to Girard, it is human mimesis, different from animal’s, which shaped 
human cultural evolution. 
19 Girard distinguished between imitation and mimesis. Inference and appropriation 
are the characteristics of human mimesis, while representation is the only feature of 
imitation in the animal world - especially observed in monkeys. 
However, most scholars use an intuitive approach to analyse 
individual’s action (Mercer, 2005: 8). According to “this” psychology, 
to think it is to act. It is possible to grasp what people think or want 
through their acts or behaviours,16 and vice versa.17 Yet, this approach 
does not address the psychological dimension, because human mind’s 
analysis is still avoided. Therefore, it is necessary to use a theory of causal 
explanation of human action, which does explain human behaviour 
integrating human mind’s role. In other words, without knowing 
desires and opinions of an individual, it is not possible to understand 
how environmental stimuli are processed and, thus, it is not possible to 
understand which stimulus works and how (Mercer, 2005: 10). 
Some psychological explanations use schemes of belief in order to 
match external stimuli with decision-makers’ behaviours. Yet, the way 
through which schemes of belief are formed is just presumed by those 
decision-makers’ behaviour. Thus, for example, Stalin’s foreign policy 
decisions are always described as ideologically based, i.e. guided by 
the Communist ideology. For this reason, Stalin’s behaviour has been 
labelled as anti-pragmatic. However, as it will be described in the third 
chapter, this label is clearly flawed and perhaps based on ideological 
assumption itself. 
In short, without any notion about how individuals’ mind processes 
external stimuli and incentives, it is not possible to make any inference 
about what may be individuals’ intentions and, thus, what drives people 
behaviours. The same stimulus or incentive can trigger different reactions 
among different people. Then, investigating what are the decision-
makers’ desires is needful to understand how they shape foreign policy 
decisions. Only through a cognitive approach, that evaluates mind’s 
role influence on people behaviour, will be possible to understand what 
rational behaviours or accurate judgments means for each individual. 
In this way, a cognitive approach fully develops the explanatory and 
predictive power of human behaviour model of analysis.   
16 Fundamental assumption of the behaviourist approach (Skinner, 1972). 
17 For example, Samuelson (1948) proposed a theory of revealed preferences, which 
reverses the previous assumption, analysing the behaviour of the individual to infer his 
preferences. Yet, in this way, the mind is still eliminated by the calculations. A similar 














































































21sum, these mechanisms would be at the core of human socialization, 
allowing people to communicate and react to a specific external 
stimulus appropriately (Fogassi & Welsh, 2002: 19). 
Therefore, the centre of human learning, i.e. the mind, is nothing more 
than a great mimetic organ that, through strictly congruent and largely 
congruent imitation, is able to learn/internalize the mental states of other 
people, such as desires, opinions, intentions and goals.23 This has prompted 
several researchers to advance the idea that the innate ability to imitate 
would allow humans being, since their infancy, to directly copy others’ 
desires, giving little attention to instrumental gestures/behaviours.24 
In summary, it can be said that the numerous empirical studies, 
conducted among the field of developmental psychology, neuroscience 
and neuropsychology, tend to converge in the same direction described 
by Rene Girard. Contrary to what has been assumed up to now, imitation 
plays a crucial role in human learning process as well as in the socialization 
processes. Indeed, through imitation, people understands the surrounding 
environment and react appropriately to it. Thus, imitation does act as a 
processor of external stimuli and incentives. It would be the key to do 
understand how the Theory of Mind develops, that is, a crucial factor in 
understanding how conflict emerges between people since it allows to 
understanding: a) how a decision-maker interprets other actors’ desires as 
well as b) how he determines their values and goals. It would also provide 
a new tool to grasp what influences have the external social forces over 
decision-making process.
Mimesis, violence and conflict. Construction of a model of analysis
How does the social matrix of human desire lead people to violence 
and conflict? How mimetic desire triggers the emergence of conflict 
23 Unlike animals, children can understand the desired behind the gesture of an adult 
even though the goal was not reached (Meltzoff, 1995). In addition, they choose what 
to imitate consciously, and try to accomplish the goal, rather than repeat the gesture 
superficially (Meltzoff, 1996, 2002). This led Meltzoff and Decety (2003) to conclude 
as early as children, human being is able to imitate what he intends to do and what he 
actually does (496). 24 For further information on the theory of the objective of imitation (Trevarthen, 
Kokkinaki, Fiamenghi & 1999; & Wolschlager Bekkering 2002). 
individualistic and romantic fascinations, human desire genesis holds 
the key to the conflict between people. 
Therefore, if human desire is socially constructed, this means that 
humanity consciously stands for desire (Souillac, 2014: 343). Indeed, 
it is through imitation that people would be able,20 since new-born, to 
develop their understanding of others based on experience (Meltzoff 
& Decety, 2003). In particular, this mechanism develops in three 
phases: firstly, recognizing the equivalence between perceived actions 
and that performed, thanks to the human innate ability to imitate.21 
Secondly, constructing a direct experience, through a daily map of the 
combination of actions performed-observed and mental experiences – 
i.e. feelings. Thirdly, deducing others’ experiences, grasping the others’ 
states of mind observing how they behave (Garrels, 2006: 67). 
If this is true, what are the consequences? What influences have 
imitation on human experience as well as his ability to grasp the 
surrounding environment? The main result is that between thought 
and action there is not a linear relationship. Mind, through mimetic 
mechanism, does “alter” or “manipulate” the information internalized/
learned by people.22 In particular, this alteration consist in two ways 
of understanding: strictly congruent and largely congruent. In the first 
case, people understanding would coincide perfectly with the action 
observed, which would be useful when a detailed analysis of what has 
been observed is needful. In the second case, human understanding 
is broader. Then, his response is similar, but not identical to observed 
action. Through this mechanism, people would identify the implicit 
goal behind the observed action. Thus, they sought to reach the 
same desire using different tools or methods than those observed. In 
20 An innate capacity that would result from the presence of neurons mimesis. Neurons 
are brain cells that are activated when an individual observes a movement or when it is 
performed by one another. They are able to create an instant shared experience from the 
action observed or performed (Rizzolati et al., 1996). In addition, they represent the first 
identified neural mechanism “that allows a direct matching between visual description 
of an action and its execution” (Rizzolati et al., 2001: 663). 
21 Recognized as equivalent action observed or perceived and performed is a crucial 
fact because of what the authors infer that, like monkeys, the man since he was born, has 
mimetic neurons and that these are active from birth. 22 Through imitation, infants learn the target or the target behind their peers’ 
behaviours. This means that perception and production speak the same language 
(Meltzoff and Moore, 1999: 54). In this way, external stimuli and incentives are perceived, 














































































23Therefore, not the whole kinds of learned behaviours concur to 
generate violence. Those that do not arouse rivalry – drove by not–
acquisitive desire – are behaviours whose objects are real and linked 
to the basic needs of a community. In other words, they have intrinsic 
value because the community existence can be objectively in danger 
without them.28 On the other hand, those behaviours that elicit rivalries 
– drove by acquisitive desires – are the whole kinds of behaviour 
that develop between two actors who have already reached their 
subsistence level. In other words, those behaviours are not pursued 
to meet basic needs; instead, their targets are metaphysical desires: 
honour, prestige, glory etc. Without any guide, human beings find 
themselves without any means to discern between these two kinds of 
behaviour leaving the whole community in danger.29  
Once the player has chosen to acquire a certain behaviour, a sort 
of triangular relationship between the subject (who desire), object 
(desired) and model (imitated) is established. This particular relationship 
established by mimetic mechanism suggests that the subject perceives 
that object desirable not because of its intrinsic value, rather because 
it is owned by the model. In other words, acquiring that object, the 
subject is trying to imitate the model. The subject’s real intentions are 
not the acquisition of the object, then. In fact, his aim it to imitate his 
model to become like him, that is, to replace it. In this case, the more 
the subject imitate, the higher the competition.  
Indeed, as for the master-disciple relation, the imitation of the model 
results in negative consequences. Since acquisitive imitation leads to 
a replacement of the model (imitated) by the subject (who imitates), 
perceive that disciple his protégé. However, the more the pupil becomes like the master, 
the more the master feels his authority threatened. Without consciously realizing it, the 
master starts to imitate his pupil in desiring with more ardour to remain a master – to 
preserve his identity of a model. Soon, then, the positive and constructive relationship 
between the couple turns into a destructive relationship, where the disciple tries to 
break the domination of the master – becoming itself a master and craving recognition 
as equal. While the master hampers the disciple efforts in order to defend its dominance 
or superiority over the disciple itself – reaffirming his identity as master. Therefore, 
violence and desire are closely linked to mimesis. 28 The terms object and behaviour are used interchangeably, since the object of rivalry 
may be real, physical, or simply a behaviour, or a particular foreign policy strategy. 
Therefore, they will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
29 Sometimes, indeed, what seems real - as the value in a particular subject, in fact, it 
is not.  
between two actors? According to Girard, violence is a phenomenon of 
mimetic contagion. In particular, Girard says that violence is “a perfect 
mimetic relationship, therefore perfectly mutual,” where “everyone 
imitates the violence of the other and returns it to him” (Girard, 1996: 
370). It would emerge when people sought to acquire others’ desires 
that, by their nature, are not acquirable. In this way, because of the 
more and more obstacles that people encounters, mimetic competition 
can lead to violence and conflict. These mechanisms were known 
even by primitive societies. Indeed, Girard observes that because of 
the reciprocity nature of human violence, among primitive societies, 
mechanisms of violence prevention were based on the prohibition of 
those desires that could generate conflict: acquisitive desires.25 
According to Girard, representative and acquisitive dimension are 
not the only one that characterize mimesis. In order to understand how 
mimesis leads to violence and conflict, Girard identifies a third dimension, 
intrinsically linked to the acquisitive: the dimension of appropriation.26 
According to Girard, if “acquisitive imitation and the appropriation 
dimension were included, imitation understood as a social phenomenon 
would become” a phenomenon of conflict based on mimetic rivalry. 
(1979: 9). In summary, human mimesis can be dangerous when it is 
not canalized to non-acquisitive behaviours. These dimensions trigger 
a mimetic competition – between the desiring subject and its model – 
that could ultimately turns into violent rivalry.27 
25 For example, in Indian society, the ancient caste system is a good model of behaviour 
established by the whole community and religious legitimacy. Through intermarriage, 
on the one hand, it prohibited the move from one caste to another. On the other hand, it 
banned the contest for women of different castes. In a society where man control both 
the government and the military institutions, this rules prevent any mimetic rivalry that 
has as its object sexual desires between members of different castes. Indeed, the most 
serious danger was an internal conflict between classes, which would inevitably lead 
to the collapse of the entire society. The “purity” of the caste was, thus, instrumental 
in maintaining a balance in Indian society. For offenders, there was no mercy. Become 
untouchable, they were expelled from the caste system – i.e. the whole society.  
26 In some writings, Girard has markedly distinguished the second and the third 
dimension (Girard, 1979: 9). However, in subsequent works, this distinction is not 
repeated, preferring to emphasize the fact that both these dimensions are needful 
to define human mimesis. In essence, the acquisitive dimension always follows the 
dimension of appropriation, as two parts of a single dimension. 27 At the individual level, the model of rivalry between master and disciple is an 
effective analogy. On the one hand, the disciple does not simply imitate the gestures of 
the teacher, but he acquires them. He tries to be like him, to take his place. On the other 














































































25each other security. Since the same desire drives each behaviours, 
both actors perceive each other desire as genuine and rational, while, 
at the same time, they perceive the other’s identity as a vital threat to 
their security.     
At this point, the object totally disappears from the competition, 
and the subject-model relationship becomes an overt rivalry towards a 
metaphysical thing: the will to fulfil each other desire. In other words, 
the more mimetic competition increase, the more both actors’ focus 
shifts from the object disputed to the actors’ mutual impediments 
deadlock. When mimetic rivalry emerges, the corollary result is 
that both actors starts to perceive each other as mutually different 
– antithetic – though they are nothing more than double. Then, in 
contrast with the other model of conflict analysis, this model claims 
that when it comes to metaphysical object – such as power, prestige, 
honour – the conflict of interests between actors is not rational. They 
claim to be rational, but each set of interests is designed to fulfil the 
same desire, which is perceived as original but it has a mimetic matrix. 
Therefore, within mimetic rivalries, decisions and perceptions of those 
involved are the result of the rivalry itself.  
Therefore, the emergence of an overt mimetic rivalry takes place 
when two thresholds are crossed:32 threshold of metaphysical desire and 
threshold of differentiation. When the metaphysical desire threshold 
is reached, it means that competition has ceased to be conducted 
towards the acquisition of real objects; rather it is conducted to fulfil a 
metaphysical desire – honour, glory, prestige. “If you ask their opponents 
why they fight, they call on notions such as the prestigious” (Ibid. 375). 
Although perceived as real by the actors involved, concepts such as 
prestige, honour and credibility “have no tangible reality, and yet, the 
fact of competing for them makes them seem more real than any other 
object” (Ibid. 366). “Fighting for prestige means fighting literally for 
nothing. In the absence of any concrete object. [Then], the nothingness 
of prestige should look like everything... for all opponents” (Ibid. 376). 
The threshold of differentiation, instead, is achieved when mimetic 
competition reached is final stage. At that point, coexistence within the 
dyad is perceived as no longer possible. Actors’ perceptions reached 
the point of incompatibility. According to this paper, the whole process 
32 It means an overt rivalry explicit. 
the more mimesis develops, the greater the threat to model’s identity. 
When one of the actors perceives the tie that binds them as a threat 
mark, the breaking point is reached. From this moment, the transition 
from mimesis of appropriation – towards the object – to mimesis of 
antagonism – towards the model – is occurred (Souillac, 2014: 344). 
However, several aspects need to be clarified before any further analysis 
of antagonism mimesis last-phase is possible, namely rivalry. 
From competition towards objects to rivalry towards desires
How does transition from mimesis of appropriation to mimesis 
of antagonism occurs? Mutual mimesis between subject and model 
originally develops around an object. The latter has no intrinsic value, 
yet it gains more and more value because of the mimetic competition 
intensification. Although it seems the core of the competition, the object 
can be any, because its “value grows in proportion to the resistance its 
acquisition encounters”, which leads to an increase in the perceived 
model’s value as well (Girard, 1996: 364). This statement implies 
that: firstly, the core of mimesis is the model, rather than the object. 
Secondly, the object value depends on the subject-model [mimetic] 
competition itself. Thirdly, accompanied by this competitive relation, 
a selective attention concurs to increase – alter – the competition 
weight. Finally, mimetic competition turns a free-intrinsic value object 
in a “prohibited object”,30 leading the two actors to compete harder 
and harder up to the violent escalation. 
At this point, the “elements of the system react on each other; 
the prestige of the model, the strength that he opposes, the object 
value, the force of desire that inspires, every elements continue to 
strengthen in a process of positive feedback” (Ibid., 365). In other 
words, mimetic competition is becoming increasingly vicious. The 
final phase is reached when mimetic competition turns the actors as 
“double”.31 When total symmetry of desires is reached, both actors 
start to perceive each other as competitor, enemy, and vital threat to 
30 It is forbidden in the sense that each of them forbids the other to acquire that object. 
31 Double does not intend to describe two specular entities, but rather an endogenous 
product of the acquisitive mimesis which led both actors to have the same desire, and 














































































27real asset, such as oil. Rather, rivalry emerges because both actors 
imitate each other until they become so similar that the presence of 
one becomes a deadly threat to the other. Level of incompatibility is 
reached due to the mimetic competition, which progressively increase 
the symbolic value of the object. When the actors find themselves as 
double, the competition turns into a rivalry, where everyone craves the 
same metaphysical desire. The latter, however, genuinely perceived as 
rational and original, cannot accept the presence of its own double. 
Therefore, “each model is turned into anti-model… Instead of looking 
like, it is now to defer” (Ibid. 371). 
In sum, competition among rivals is triggered by mimesis. The 
process gets the relations worse and worse because of the double bond 
mimetic hallucinatory effect. Selective attention emerges between 
the two actors, which leads them to weight the competition for the 
contended object, a greater meaning than it really has. When both 
thresholds are crossed, competition turns into a rivalry characterized by 
a zero-sum game. Once the rivalry has emerged, actors perceive each 
other as anti-model, thus, the success of one side coincides exactly 
with the defeat – or death – of the other. At this point, both actors 
perceive violence and war as the only viable solution to resolve the 
conflict, that is, to eliminate the vital threat. Since the theoretical base 
should now be clear, it is possible to delineate some general theoretical 
conclusion over the opened issues discussed in this paper.   
Rationality of the process, ir-rationality of the result
What are the implications over human rationality when it comes 
to mimetic rivalry? Looking at it from the outside, the mimetic rivalry 
dynamics seem to offer us a crazy, irrational result. Actors imitate each 
other until they become doubles. However, at the same time, they 
increasingly perceive each other as competitors, until they perceive the 
elimination of their enemy as the only viable alternative.35 However, 
35 The subject wants to acquire that object because he thinks it has great value. The 
mimetic process starts. However, at the same time, the model still holds the object chose 
by the subject. Then, the more the subject tries to gain that object, the more the model 
hampers his efforts. Finally, both the actors decide to remove the only obstacle to the 
attainment or the maintenance of their desire. 
starts from the mechanism of un-differentiation (or imitation) that 
made the actors increasingly similar to each other. Then, when their 
mutual desire has formed, they cannot tolerate each other’s presence, 
because it is perceived as a threat to their identity, that is, to their 
original and genuine – national –desire. From now on, it seems that the 
two actors starts to differ because of their objective conflict of rational 
interests. In addition, the point of incompatibility is reached because 
actors are driven by irrational beliefs/perceptions, which hamper any 
peaceful resolution to their conflict. According to the mimetic rivalry 
model, instead, incompatibility and “rational-irrationality”33 emerge 
due to the in-differentiation process of mimesis that lies behind the 
differentiation among the actors.  
Therefore, even though they genuinely believe in their claims, 
the antithetic difference among rivals is just a myth, used to conceal, 
intentionally or not, mimetic competition result: the double (Ibid. 
373). In other words, treating the actors as antithetic entities means 
to do believe in each mythical claim of genuine difference. In fact, 
differentiation is a mythical framework resulted from the hallucination 
in which they fall down within the rivalry. Taking for granted those 
claims means not going to the source of the problem, beyond their 
hallucination: the double mimetic bond. When mimetic competition 
is triggered, both actors imitate the object and they impede the full 
acquisition of the object itself, at the same time. The ambiguity that 
comes up, always hidden by mimetic dynamics, generates the “blind 
rationality” that characterize both actors’ behaviour.34 
In conclusion, according to this model of conflict analysis, rivals’ 
conflict is not generated by the antithesis of interests, rather by the 
similarity of desires. In other words, rivalry does not arise because 
two or more actors have the same interests – for example, a specific 
33 That is the irrational behaviour – acting, as they were antithetic – perceived as 
rational by both actors.  34 For example, as in the case of the master-disciple, on the one hand the disciple feels 
he do must imitate with even more ardour its model, on the other this feeling engenders 
more frustration because his master hampers his efforts to gain the object (i.e. master 
status). Despite the disciple justify, at first, this behaviour of the model, the more intense 
becomes imitation, the more the justification becomes fragile, until the disciple can no 
longer justify the reason of a lack of recognition of the level reached. Then, the result is 
that the disciple feels entitled to rival with their master as an equal in order to gain is 














































































29able to channel all the frustrations and all the growing violence on 
the prohibited object towards the model. Girard identifies it as the 
scapegoat mechanism.
Through this mechanism, a community on the edge of an internal 
collapse finds new identity through the elimination of a sacrificial victim 
arbitrarily designated: a scapegoat. Thanks to this channel, a powerful 
polarization emerges within the community: the entire community 
does coagulate against the external enemy – or an internal member 
perceived as out of the community. According to the executioner point 
of view, the victim is guilty of endangering the very existence of the 
entire community. However, though the scapegoat elimination can 
provide a certain peace within the community, the reached peace is 
flawed. In fact, since the scapegoat, by nature, is not the source of the 
problem, if the rivalry has a winner, this does not mean the end of the 
rivalry itself. The winner will go in search for a new rival, that is, for a 
new scapegoat to kill.  
In international politics, this mechanism finds place as the linkage 
decision-makers’ perceptions to the whole community. Through the 
scapegoat mechanism, indeed, the entire population is mobilized/
plagued by the zero-sum game perceived among the elite, or vice 
versa.37 When the perceived enemy is a member of the community 
– such as an ethnic, political, religious or linguistic minority – the 
result is its elimination from the community. When it comes to an 
external scapegoat – such as another nation – then this mechanism of 
violence channelling may results from diplomatic disputes, economic 
retaliations, and military disputes. 
In conclusion, mimetic rivalry model allows an “external”-analysis 
of international rivalry phenomenon, that is, an analysis not affected 
by the altered subjectivity of the actors involved. This implies, firstly, 
the ability to identify the irrational basis of a claimed rational foreign 
policy. Secondly, the chance to understand the real causes that led 
states to do act irrationally. Thirdly, it provides the ability to identify 
the consequences of a violent channelling process, before its 
emergence.
37 A mechanism that works in both directions: the elite can plagues the rest of the 
population and vice versa. In the first case, the elite consciously influences public 
opinion (for a discussion: Levy, 2011; Levy & Vakili, 2014). In the second case, however, 
public opinion influences the élite – such as within democratic systems. 
this irrational result is achieved through a rational process. Indeed, 
when the rivalry has been established, the dominant perception, which 
influences every strategy within the dyad, is the logic of the dominant-
dominated. This logic leads the actors to violence, whose form is linked 
to other factors such as power symmetry, religious difference, cultural 
difference and so forth. 
As we can notice, according to both actors, everything that 
happens is rational, which is the elimination of their vicious rival. In 
fact, the only rational aspect of the process is imitation, because it 
represents the only way through which people learn and develop. 
However, if the imitation is focused on non-acquisitive objects, then 
a mimetic competition can start, leading to a more dangerous rivalry. 
After that, once the dominant logic affects the dyad, the result is 
irrational violence. Both actors are symmetrically connected by a 
strong reciprocal mimetic relationship, which leads to differentiation 
and reciprocal violence.36 
Ultimately, the mimetic analysis allows the analysis of rivals’ 
relationships to move away from their altered point of view. This is 
essential in order to understand why a certain behaviour becomes 
strongly irrational, despite the blindness of the actor itself. When the 
misleading trap of a natural spontaneity of human desire is unveiled, 
it is possible to go further towards the decryption of those dynamics 
and behaviours, based on mimesis, which lead both actors to struggle 
to death for symbolic objects. 
Differentiation through the mechanism of the scapegoat 
Once the threshold of differentiation is crossed, actors’ perceptions 
suddenly deteriorate turning the competition in a vicious explosive 
rivalry. However, the simple recognition of a huge difference does 
not provide us any tool to understand why the rivalry escalation is so 
dangerous. This recognition must be accompanied by a mechanism 
36 For example, when the disciple seeks to replace their master and the latter resists, 
the result can be explosive. The disciple does not recognize his master as such, but he 
considered him as an equal; the master, on the other hand, behaves with symmetrical 
reciprocity and disavows his disciple. The result is that, as long as the master is alive, 
the disciple cannot become the master, while, as long as the disciple will threaten his 















































































In the phase preceding the differentiation, the relations between 
the two actors are characterized by progressively higher degree of 
reciprocity. The more the object value increases, the more the subject-
model competition/contrast becomes intense. Triggered by the 
emulation, competition is characterized by higher and higher levels of 
reciprocity. Engendered by the already emerged selective attention, 
the dominant-dominated logic starts to affect more and more the 
dyad result, that is, actors’ foreign policy. Empirically, this alternation 
emerges both in foreign and domestic policy. Then, the domestic and 
foreign realm cannot be separated since they strongly influence each 
other. This model suggests that a mimetic competition affects the 
domestic policy of both actors and vice versa.
 
Reciprocity after the break
When the breaking point is reached, rivalry is overt. This leads to 
greater reciprocity between the two actors. Moreover, they start to 
perceive each other as antithetic, weighting the opposite rival as a vital 
threat to their security, ultimately a scapegoat. Even the domestic realm 
is plagued by the consequences of mimetic rivalry namely the scapegoat 
mechanism. Public opinion and stakeholders can find themselves both 
polarized against the rival. If this happen, dyad’s outcome would be 
characterized by more and more violence and conflict. Reciprocity, which 
pervades the dyad, can occur in every sectors.39 Particularly important 
are historical, economic and political factors. 
In conclusion, to be able to identify the emergence of a mimetic 
rivalry is necessary to use both types of analysis, quantitative and 
qualitative. On the one hand, through a quantitative analysis, it is 
possible to determine the real value of the emulated object. On the 
other hand, through a qualitative analysis of public statements and 
public debates within the dyad, it is possible to identify those symbolic 
objects that sign the presence of a mimetic rivalry.
39 The greater or lesser reciprocity depends on the level of subsistence achieved or not 
by one of the two actors in that particular sector. 
Operationalization of the mimetic rivalry model
Initial phase of emulation
The emulation phase represents the first stage of a mimetic 
rivalry. In this phase, the triangle subject-object-model is formed. The 
object contended tends to be real, such as a particular behaviour or 
a particular resource. Then, the subject emulates its model, that is, 
the actor on which he focuses its attention, trying to acquire certain 
characteristics, gaining certain resources, which can be real as far as 
their symbolic value is much higher than their intrinsic one.  
The objects contended are those from which do not depend the 
actor’s existence. Furthermore, they have already an owner – the 
model, thus, their symbolic value strictly depends on the model whose 
are linked. The main distinction is between strategically vital objects – 
truly linked to the independence, autonomy and sovereignty of a state 
– and those acquired for reasons of prestige, credibility, and honour.38 
Then, the model shifts its focus from the object contended to the 
competition between subject and model. 
Reciprocity before the break
38 This applies not only to the objects quality, but also to their quantity. Regarding 
behaviours, it does not weight their type only, but also the specific intensity with which 














































































33characterizes the emergence of Soviet-American rivalry. According to 
this paper, instead, both Soviet and American messianisms reflect the 
metaphysical desire of these two nations towards the subversion of 
the dominated-dominant logic imposed by what they perceived as a 
foreigner oppressor, which both expelled from their country, namely 
the British power-influence. 
Origins of American and Russian metaphysical desires
Both countries achieved the independence at the end of an enduring 
rivalry against the British.41 However, both logic of counter-dominion 
against the British emerge only at the end of the WWI. US, indeed, 
through Wilson’s Fourteen Points, for the first time, chose to take “full 
responsibility” of world leadership – replacing the British (Del Pero, 
2008: 206). The Soviets, on the contrary, through their internationalist 
manifesto, expressed the desire of not being-dominated by any 
external actor anymore, namely by imperialist capitalist nations. Two 
metaphysical desires that has occurred when both actors have reached 
their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Therefore, each model of dominion – emerged to fulfil their 
metaphysical desires – has been affected by the enduring rivalry with 
the British.42 Indeed, both models imitated the British, in terms of similar 
goals but through different methods to achieve it. The goal was to do 
rule; the desire to become preponderant power, as UK was. Methods 
were different but always alternative to the British’s.43 In particular, US 
model was based on economic and cultural influence – the relation 
41 US - UK: 1837-1861; Russia - UK: 1877-1923 (Thompson, 1995: 199). In particular, 
in the case of the USSR, after the armed uprising in October 1918, it took other three 
years – Treaty of Riga of 1921 – before the Soviets were able to consolidate their power, 
precisely because of the influence of outside powers, including UK (Kennan, 1960: 166-
167).42 In fact, in the ‘20s, the real Soviet enemy was London (Kennan, 1960: 224). Indeed, 
there was a huge financial dependence between Moscow and London. Moscow had a 
debt of 568 million pounds. The British credit represented the ¾ of the Soviet debt (Di 
Nolfo, 2009: 37).  43 The programs of both, indeed, “envisioned the sweeping away of the Europe-
centered system [as well as] the end of imperialism” (Harper, 2011: 27).
Origins of the cold war
 
US - USSR: destined to collide?  
Known in history as the “Truman Doctrine”, the newly elected 
President of the US Truman’s speech to the Congress marked a 
landmark in the history of US-URSS relations. In that occasion, the head 
of the American administration strongly declared to consider USSR 
as the American bitter rival. First results of this overtly declaration 
of rivalry were the Marshall Plan, which raised the political and 
economic tension with Moscow in West Europe (Del Pero, 2008: 286), 
and the containment policy, which led the rivalry to a global military 
escalation (Ibid. 285).40 On the Soviet front, Roosevelt’s death and the 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki events marked the beginning of a long period 
of uncertainty for Stalin (Harper, 2011: 53). Distrust and suspicion 
triggered a new vicious circle that led to the first military clash between 
the two actors through the Korean War. 
If this represents the beginning of the Cold War, what are its origins 
or causes? Many scholars claim that the traces of the bipolar rivalry are 
to find in the contrast between the internationalist Wilsonian manifesto 
and Lenin’s Third International. A rivalry, then, triggered by ideology 
and power competition (Del Pero, 2008: 211). In fact, according to 
this paper, the ideological factor is not a cause, yet a consequence 
of another phenomenon, namely the emergence of mimetic rivalry. 
Indeed, ideology is only a descriptive factor bare of explanatory 
power. It does not help to understand the origin of the ambiguity that 
40 Although some authors state the opposite, namely that there was a specific plan, 
the Truman Doctrine, along with the telegram Kennan, provided a “clear indications, 














































































35Therefore, Washington and Moscow foreign policies were not so 
different at the end of the Great War. Both labelled with misleading 
factors such as ideology and messianism, both nations were driven 
by the metaphysical desire to dominate. On the one hand, US was 
imitating UK’s financial model “by replacing the pound with the dollar” 
through the implementation in Europe of “Dawes” Plan and “Yong” 
Plan, accompanied by policies of “Americanization” (Del Pero, 2008: 
239-245). On the other side, the Soviets wanted to imitate the British 
preponderant power with the strongest tool they thought they had: 
Communist propaganda.
The beginning of the mimetic competition - towards the threshold 
of differentiation
Despite the fact that the signs of a mirror mimetic rivalry between 
Washington and Moscow against London seemed to bring the two 
powers to collide, this vicious process suddenly stopped in the early 
‘20s because of both Wilson (1921) and Lenin’s death (1922). The first 
event pushed back in the corner any American desire to dominate and 
marked the beginning of the Republicans’ isolationist period inaugurate 
by Harding and hold by Coolidge and Hoover. The second one left the 
power to Stalin (in 1922) and, thus, the shift of the Soviets selective 
attention from London to Washington – symbolized by the termination 
of the NEP and the adoption of the five-year plan.47 This moment can 
be labelled as the beginning of the Soviet emulation of the American 
preponderant economic and military power. At this point, the mimetic 
ties between the two became stronger.48 
Not surprisingly, this phase of US-URSS relationships has been 
described as “pragmatic”, rather than ideological (Gaddis, 1978). 
47 Starting from the 20’s, Russia became a major American market, and by 1930, 
American exports to Russia exceeded in value those of every other country and American 
businesses relied on this export market. 48 American companies shared patents and personnel to assist in the economic 
development of Russia. By the mid-1920s, 
American business and industry supplied more than 25 percent of all of Russia’s 
imports. In 1929, blackberries than 2,000 American industrial and agricultural experts, 
engineers and mechanics worked in the Soviet Union. During the 1930s, hundreds of 
Soviet students and engineers studied in America and returned to the Soviet Union. 
between US and Latin America nations is an evident example.44 Soviet 
model, rather, was based on social and cultural influence, that is, on 
political propaganda (Kennan, 1960: 171). Different methods that also 
reflected the economic and political gap between Washington and 
Moscow in the 20’s.45 
The seed of their model of dominance grew up already in the post-
WWI period. Indeed, both messianic foreign policies failed because of 
their inner ambiguity. On the one hand, US ambiguity lied in Wilson’s 
attempt to build a new world order by co-opting the European 
great powers, and, at the same time, using the new world order 
negotiations as a means to force them to accept the new American 
supremacy (Del Pero, 2008: 229-230). On the other hand, Soviet’s 
ambiguity lied in Lenin’s genuine attempt to normalize USSR relations 
with the European capitalist powers, and, at the same time, using 
the recognition negotiations as a means to spread their dominance 
through the Comintern foreign propaganda.46 Instead, through the 
“mimetic lens”, the relationship between Washington and Moscow, 
on the one hand, and London, on the other hand, these ambiguities 
would be solved. According to this lens, like in master-disciple dynamic, 
the disciple (US, and USSR) was seeking recognition from his master 
(British preponderant power), because he was trying to imitate his 
model’s behaviour (UK model of dominion). Then, since US and USSR 
wanted to be recognized as equal preponderant power, they were also 
acting like a preponderant power, that is, spreading their model of 
dominance over other countries.  
44 Reference to the so-called Roosevelt Corollary, 1904. For further details, Del Pero, 
2008: 185. 45 The American preponderance power was more than evident if we analyse the 
consequences of the financial payments imposed by the Allied. (Di Nolfo, 2009: 37). This 
gave to the US an “unquestioned economic supremacy” (Del Pero, 2008: 214). 
46 Some scholars interpret the ambiguities arising from the Soviet will of deceiving the 
European powers and, in the meantime, to wage a struggle between capitalist states to 
grab economic contracts with Moscow (Kennan, 1960: 158). However, this argument 
is flawed because of its inability to go beyond a simple description of an ideological 
behaviour. In fact, it fails to explain, firstly, the interest showed by the European powers 
in recognizing the Soviet government toward a normalization of the relations, rather 
pursuing mere economic interest. Secondly, the Politburo intentions to pursue a 
normalization of the relations with the West were to gain the recognition were genuine. 
Thirdly, it does not explain true and genuine contrast resulting between Narkomindel 















































































37that the establishment of normal relations with USSR could provide, 
because the latter was already perceived as a natural US enemy. 
However, this process – which could led to cross sooner the 
differentiation threshold by two powers – was held back by three 
factors. Firstly, the outbreak of WWII, which placed both nations in 
a struggle for survival, thus, pushing back in the corner any desire 
of world domination.51 Secondly, as we will see, rivalry between 
Washington and Tokyo over the Pacific hijacked Americans’ selective 
attention (Harper, 2011: 34-35). Thirdly, when FDR came into power in 
1933, his geopolitical vision and his personal beliefs influenced deeply 
USSR-US relations.
FDR and Stalin: pragmatic cooperation with the “evil”
 
When FDR came into power in 1932, USSR-US relations profoundly 
changed. The issue of recognition, which during the isolationist 
period increased its negative symbolic value, was suddenly resolved. 
FDR, bypassing the formal diplomatic channels, addressed the issue 
personally, aided by his own advisers. It was the first of a long series 
of cooperative signals between Washington and Moscow. In addition, 
how the recognition issue was resolved represented another landmark 
of the USSR-US relations. Personal diplomacy, indeed, played a 
fundamental role within White House and Kremlin relations.  
Starting from the first two years of his mandate – 1932-33 – the idea 
of a constructive cooperation with Moscow drove American foreign 
policy. The first product of this policy was the opening of diplomatic 
relations with the Soviets in 1933 (Del Pero, 2008: 248). Rather than 
being a sign of a global openness to the foreign countries, it was more 
a sort of “special relationship” between Washington and Moscow. 
During the same years, through the adoption of what had been 
called laws of neutrality, US strongly limited its bonds with European 
countries. Indeed, FDR felt “a strong aversion towards Europe”, which 
was accused of being guilty of the WWI outbreak. A tie that bound 
FDR’s foreign policy to Wilson’s (Ibid. 247).  
51 That is, the decisions that the actors made were likely a reflection of actual needs, 
rather than metaphysical desires. 
The simple ideology-pragmatism pendulum cannot explain the inner 
ambiguities that characterized even this phase of the American-Soviet 
relation. If it is true that, on the one hand, relations between the two 
nations were voted towards a greater exchange in trading. On the other 
hand, the issue of Soviet government recognition, formally needful to 
increase the benefits from the trading relations, became increasingly 
hot and triggered a strong political resistance in the US Congress (Hoff-
Wilson, 1974). An ambiguity that the pragmatism-ideology pendulum 
can only describe without providing any explanatory arguments. 
Instead, this situation acquires greater clarity when analysed through 
the “mimetic lens”. 
The question of Soviet government recognition was not perceived 
as a secondary problem. In the early 20’s, when Stalin decided to 
launch the Five-Years Plan of massive industrialization of the Soviet 
economy, the emulation between Moscow and Washington grew up 
significantly. The more the plan went further, the less the economic 
gap between Moscow and Washington. Thus, along with a stronger 
emulation by the Soviets, parts of the American administrations 
started to feel threatened by the greater power that USSR was gaining, 
though the gap between the two nations were significantly high yet. 
Triggered by the Soviet emulation,49 some political parties started 
to oppose to the Soviet government recognition because it would 
allow greater economic benefits for Moscow. Then, because of the 
emulation process, the issue of recognition gained more value that it 
actually had. In this way, as the master, Washington could not recognize 
an actor who, by some influential figures,50 was already perceived 
as an US bitter rival. The question of recognition became a sort of 
“prohibited” object within a context of growing mimetic competition 
between Moscow and Washington.  
Therefore, US irrational foreign policy towards USSR was due to 
the emergence of the selective attention between Washington and 
Moscow, and by the emerging mimetic competition between them. 
Indeed, the more the economic emulation were growing, the more the 
fear in Washington. Someone were already convinced of the hazard 
49 Rather than by a real competition between two great powers. 
50 For example, George F. Kennan, former leading figure in the American Embassy in 
Moscow. He will become the head of the Policy Planning Staff, important political and 














































































39Divergence of interests that was even larger within FDR’s grand 
design over the new world order. FDR’s project was based on four 
pillars: Western democracy spread on a global level, concert of power, 
“four policemen” and, last but not the least, the recognition of a 
special and privileged role for Washington. Reactions to this project 
are hard to explain using ideology factor. In fact, Stalin was not only 
favorable but he considered the “four policeman” idea as necessary 
and rewarding. “The just rewards Stalin desired included respect for 
the USSR recognition and himself personally” (Harper, 2011: 43). 
On the contrary, the project was strongly disapproved by London. It 
could not be otherwise, since it firstly targeted European colonialism 
(Del Pero, 2008: 268). A project that, under a mimetic lens, would be 
explained as the FDR’s will to spread the American model of dominance. 
However, unlike Wilson’s, FDR’s model was not only alternative to the 
British’s, but it also addressed Moscow’s desires. Indeed, it realized 
both Soviets’ desire of a USSR global power role recognition and their 
desire of ensuring USSR security through a higher control over Europe 
in order not to be afraid of being dominated – “yet another time”. 
Strong agreement between FDR and Stalin that went beyond 
simple geopolitical interests, even though they were present.54 Indeed, 
despite Stalin’s ambiguous attitudes, FDR harboured deep trust in 
the Soviet leader as well as in their collaboration (Stefan, 1993: 762). 
Moreover, FDR did not consider Communist regime antithetic to the 
American’s and, thus, less democratic. Although he “had no particular 
illusions about the nature of democracies that would arise in the 
countries under Soviet influence”, he did not think that what would 
have happened in Polish elections would have been so different from 
what would have occurred on American soil (Del Pero, 2008: 272). 
In conclusion, focusing merely on the relationship between 
USSR and US, this paper wants to emphasize that the entire set of 
relations between FDR and Stalin represented a unique moment in the 
Soviet-American relations, characterized by cooperation and general 
understanding of each other foreign policy. An understanding not just 
tied to the personal trust between the two leaders, which in any case 
there was. Yet, it was also linked to the way FDR considered Soviet 
power in the international realm, namely a nation that was pursuing 
54 The alliance with the Soviets was vital to defeat Japan in Asia (Harper, 2011: 39-40). 
It was a period of real cooperation, rather than simple pragmatism, 
which saw an increase during WWII final years. Even Stalin wanted and 
expected cooperation with the US in the post-WWII. Yet, these were 
not false intentions. They represent a genuine will to continue the 
war-time alliance “based not on accidental or transitory motives, but 
vitally important and long-lasting interests” towards the prevention of 
new aggressions or a new war for “an extended period” (Harper, 2011: 
43). Intentions that went far beyond the mere pragmatism. Other signs 
of this deep cooperation between Moscow and Washington were Stalin’s 
“friendly” intentions about the spreading of Communism over West and 
East Europe. According to Stalin, it was to be achieved “respecting local 
sensibilities in Eastern Europe and avoiding an early break with the Allies”. 
The chosen path was the “national road” towards Communism, that is, the 
alliance between Communist Parties and other progressive groups in order 
to transform gradually Western societies working within the parliamentary 
institutions, rather than adopting the Bolshevik model, i.e. the dictatorship 
of proletariat.52 These “democratic” aspirations within Stalin’s plans were 
even stronger towards Western Europe future (Ibid. 44). 
This strong cooperation and friendly intentions became overt during 
the peace conference held in Tehran in 1943 and, in particular, at Yalta 
in 1945. In Tehran, for example, Churchill’s fears about a possible Soviet 
advance in Europe went completely unheeded. A sign of a stronger 
axiom between Washington and Moscow rather than with London. 
(Del Pero, 2008: 267). At Yalta, the contrast between the British and 
American priorities became evident. The latter were clearly different 
from those of the former. In particular, US wanted to ensure the Soviet 
participation to the Nipponese front (Stefan, 1993: 758), and to realize 
the FDR’s United Nations project (Ibid. 759). The fate of Europe, dear 
to Churchill, was a secondary issue for FDR.53 
52 The opposite intentions that guided Lenin’s foreign policy in Germany as well as in 
East Europe (Kennan, 1960: 144). A significant change that cannot be described as a 
simple result of frustration over the inability to spread the communist revolution in the 
short term (Ibid. 173). If it is true that Comintern work was to be taken seriously (Ibid. 
178), it should be used the same logic with the Narkomindel (Kocho-Williams, 2007). 53 In fact, before the war, FDR considered the Monaco agreements as the basis for a 
new world order, while Japan was the only real danger rival (Del Pero, 2008: 251). In 
addition, FDR decided to go to war after the Pearl Harbour events. Moreover, in the FDR’s 
grand design, the Germany fate was the dismemberment, while Poland was left to the 














































































41despite a mimetic competition against Moscow had already begun, 
Washington’s priority was still the definition of a global international 
order, ensuring its primacy in Asia against its bitter rival: Japan. 
However, this priority changed dramatically with Truman. First, at the 
diplomatic level, already at Yalta but even more in Potsdam, Truman’s 
arrival meant the emergence of a tough stance against the Soviet 
counterpart (Del Pero, 2008: 281). 
A sudden reorganization of American strategic priorities, which 
corresponded to a change of its geopolitical priorities. Firstly, both 
Germany and the fate of the whole Europe became suddenly the 
nucleus of the American priorities, aligning the latter to the British’s 
(Ibid. 282-3). Differently than in the past, the arrogant and brutal 
actions in Poland were perceived not only as the modus operandi 
of the Soviet regime, but as the truly nature of the Stalinist system, 
rather than classical phenomena related to a post-war period (Ibid. 
282). Europe becomes, for the first time since the WWII ended, a 
battleground between USSR and US. An object whose value will grow 
exponentially from now on, reflecting the worsening of the mimetic 
competition between Washington and Moscow. 
Therefore, contrary to what some scholars have argued, according 
to this paper, Moscow and Washington geopolitical interests were 
compatibles, but they became irreconcilable because of the new 
American administration policy. In addition, the global international 
order was replaced by a regional international order, provoking a violent 
escalation of the relationship between the two powers. A change that 
reflected the idea that American preponderant power was antithetic to 
the Soviet power. For this reason, Europe – in particular Berlin – became 
the symbolic ground of the conflict between two models of dominance. 
For the first time, the master-US felt threatened by the mimetic 
competition of the disciple-USSR and reacted by putting more and more 
obstacles to the process of emulation started by the Soviets. 
From this moment on, the mimesis of antagonism between the two 
nations increased. In this process, nuclear threat assumed a crucial 
role. If cooperation between FDR and Stalin was built thanks also to the 
American need of the Soviet support against Japan, in July 1945, the 
acquisition of the atomic bomb by Washington led Truman to advert 
Stalin that Washington had a new dangerous weapon. The result was 
only its own safety, which always denied and subjected to external 
domination. Therefore, FDR considered Soviet Union as a nation trying 
to redeem itself after decades of domination. For this reason, through 
the recognition of the rank of winning power, he believed not to have 
to worry about any further Soviet annexation not included in signed 
agreements (Stefan, 1993: 762). 
Outbreak of the rivalry – Truman’s administration  
Although Washington and Moscow were both driven by metaphysical 
desires, the first drove by a desire to dominate, while the second drove 
by a desire of no longer being dominated, FDR’s grand design and 
Stalin’s foreign policy not only coexisted. They seemed to be able to 
create positive synergies in the future. FDR, indeed, instead of pursuing 
projects targeting the Soviet desires, pushed for positive compromises 
that could guarantee Stalin basic “metaphysical need”, that is, more 
influence in Europe to ensure USSR own safety in the long run. 
However, after FDR’s death, his Vice-President, Henry S. Truman 
became new President of the United States. A turning point in the 
US foreign policy that changed dramatically and radically US position 
towards USSR. In few years, US come to perceive the Soviet Union as 
its bitter rival, that is, a mortal threat to the American security. On 
the other hand, Stalin became increasingly aware that there was not 
an actor with whom to cooperate through compromise at the other 
side, anymore. A factor that genuinely changed Stalin’s plan. Indeed, 
despite Stalin’s convictions that Communism would triumph over 
capitalism, his paramount priority was to ensure more and more 
security to the Soviet Union in order to avoid another period of 
external dominance. 
Thus, using a ‘virtual’ graph to describing Washington and Moscow 
relations, FDR and Stalin relations represented the cooperation peak 
between the two governments. When Truman came to power, US-
USSR relations worsened instantly and keep worsened until the 
establishment of a zero-sum game between them. However, how was 
such a fast deterioration among their relationship possible? What can 














































































43and Turkish issue. Although there were no evidence that Stalin had a 
strategic plan for the Middle East and the Mediterranean, Truman’s 
administration decided to ensure the protection of those territory 
directly. The economic intervention in favour of the Turkish government 
was justified as the only alternative to stem the Soviet threat to the 
Western liberal world.56 A threat that, according to Eisenhower, however, 
was only psychological and symbolic, rather than a real risk. A symbolic 
threat, then, not different from the other contended objects – Berlin, 
Manchuria, Turkey, Iran. Indeed, the value of those objects was strictly 
depended on the mimetic rivalry towards USSR. 
The decision adopted because of the Truman Doctrine represented a 
turning point. After that speech, at least by the Americans, the threshold 
of differentiation was crossed.57 Kennan’s thesis of containment policy 
towards USSR was taken up.58 The USSR, then, became the cause of 
the world’s problems, according to the Americans. Kennan’s thesis 
encouraged a black and white view of reality and an anti-communist 
backlash. In other worlds, the American point of view started to be 
altered deeply by the rivalry against the Soviets. From this point on, 
the Washington and Moscow antagonism reached, rapidly, higher and 
higher levels of tough confrontation. Through the containment policy 
implementation, indeed, the White House took concrete measures 
to stem the Communist contagion. Firstly, it created the European 
Recovery Program (ERP) - called Marshall Plan - in 1948. One year later, 
it formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Therefore, 
the emergence of the mimetic rivalry changed decisively the relations 
between the two countries, up to lead them to a military confrontation, 
that is, to perceive the elimination of each opponent as the only viable 
alternative to end the conflict. 
Officially, the Marshall Plan was intended for the whole of Europe. 
However, Washington’s real goals were: a) to prevent the spreading of 
56 Acheson said there was the possibility that three-quarters of global lands could fall 
under Communists’ control, thus, that would be allowing the Soviets to penetrate in at 
least three continents (Del Pero, 2008: 296). 57 For the first time, publicly, both two regimes were placed one at the antipodes of the 
other. Thus, US started to be perceived as antithetic or incompatible each other. 58 The adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting 
geographical and political points corresponding to the shifts and manoeuvres of Soviet 
policy that cannot be charmed or talked out of existence (Harper, 2011: 65). 
twofold: Soviet withdrew its support from the Nipponese-front and, thus, 
Washington decided to “test” the nuclear bomb over Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki (Harper, 2011: 52). After that, “instead of a relatively distant, 
benign America, Moscow had to face a more hostile US leadership, 
equipped with a weapon that could be used to deny the USSR rewards 
and counter its conventional military advantage”, particularly in Europe, 
that is, where Soviets’ desire had grown (Ibid., 54). 
Due to the nuclear threat, mimetic competition between the two 
actors increased. When the war against its old rival ended, American 
was already prepared to start another rivalry, nay, to make and then 
eliminate another scapegoat. Starting from that moment, it is evident 
the shift of the American selective attention towards the “Soviet 
threat”. Reciprocity between their foreign policy started to emerge 
in both foreign policies. Indeed, not only Stalin but the whole Soviet 
government “interpreted Hiroshima as an atomic blackmail against the 
USRR, as a threat to unleash a new, even more terrible and devastating 
war” (Ibid. 54). Because of that perception, Stalin ordered both a 
Soviet atomic bomb as well as a harder line at the diplomatic level 
against Washington. He also ordered the use of more authoritarian 
methods within Moscow’s satellite states (Ibid. 55). 
However, though Stalin considered a window for compromise still 
open,55 Truman’s administration, drove by Kennan’s indications, was 
already convinced that no interaction with “the Soviet evil” was possible 
(Ibid. 57). According to Kennan, no compromise was possible because 
Soviets’ actions were illegal, regardless of their merit and content. 
They were “flawed from the source of its irrational and aggressive 
origin that generated them” (Del Pero, 2008: 281). At this point, the 
relations continue to worsen. After the diplomatic cooperation ending, 
Washington decided to cease the economic cooperation too. “The US 
occupation Authorities in Germany [decision of ending] reparations 
payments to the USSR” as well as the decision to reject a Moscow’s 
request to Washington for major loans, “inexplicably misplaced” were 
both two emblematic signs (Harper, 2011: 61). 
The relationships between the two powers, thus, continued to 
worsen until the breaking point. The precipitating event was the Greek 
55 He was still hoping for a united Germany, friendly to the USSR. Moreover, he was still 
trying to give reassuring to the Western opinion, removing troops from Czechoslovakia 














































































452008: 298). Despite the fact that both events did not alter significantly 
the gap of power between the two nations, they concurred to worsen 
US-USSR relations. US nuclear capacity, for example, was greater 
than the Soviets’, despite the latter were leading the conventional 
weapons competition. Secondly, US conquered a much richer and 
more developed country than China, that is, Japan. However, Truman 
responded to these events with a net change of strategy, based on: a) 
the construction of the H-bomb, and b) the realization of a permanent 
war state whose characteristics were outlined in the NCS-68 document 
– United States Objectives and Programs for National Security). 
According to this plan, requested by Truman and wrote by his staff, 
Americans risked a new atomic Pearl Harbour, or a nuclear defeat in 
Europe. Furthermore, “in its quasi-apocalyptic view [the document 
said that] time was working against the United States; that the choice 
was between a dramatic expansion of power-or being in retreat and 
submission”; the NSC-68 logic was “win or die” (Harper, 2011: 93). A 
document filled by the need to implement a more aggressive policy 
in order to deal the issue of US credibility lack against the of Soviet 
threat spread. However, this document based its apocalyptic view on 
a great Soviet military c capabilities overestimation. Nevertheless, the 
threat was perceived as permanent and continuous. The document 
logic legitimized the discourse that “a defeat of free [i.e. Occidental] 
institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere”. Then, the American 
policy of global interventionism was set up. From that moment, every 
object will be treated as vital and strategic, since nothing would have 
undermined the credibility of both American preponderant power and 
its allies’ determination. 
The approval of this document came in 1950, after the North 
Korean invasion of South Korea. It represents a crucial document 
to understand US behaviour because it was not a propagandist 
document. Conversely, it was a secret document, reserved only for the 
American decision-makers. It was a cognitive and analytic tool, then, 
useful to understand how the Americans grasped USSR actions (Del 
Pero 2008: 302). Through a mimetic lens, it becomes the emblematic 
symbol of the mimetic rivalry hallucinatory results. The contents were 
similar to those already set out in the Truman Doctrine. However, 
NSC-68 expressed the need for a more aggressive foreign policy. In 
Communism among pro-US countries – such as Italy and France, and b) 
to hit the USSR in general. Indeed, the plan was outlined in such a way 
that the Russians would likely refused it. It was offered to the Soviet 
satellite countries with the intention to attract them to the West. At 
first, Stalin genuinely thought that the American offer was genuine. 
However, though too late, once he discovered the political blackmail,59 
he ordered Molotov to left the table. For Stalin, the Marshall Plan 
was the breaking point in the relations with Washington. After that, 
Stalin’s strategy changed symmetrically. His answer was to abandon 
every “popular fronts” and “national roads” to socialism. That strategy 
made sense when there was the Rooseveltian policy in the West. Since 
Truman came in to power, those policies proved ineffective results on 
the ground, thus, it was time to abandon them (Harper, 2011: 75). 
Only after that event, Stalin proceeded with the Sovietization of 
Eastern Europe. A vicious cycle of reciprocal decisions that led to the 
precipitation of Berlin situation (Ibid. 76).60 
The worst phase of the rivalry was reached with the military 
confrontation. The Communist coup in Czechoslovakia gave to Truman 
the side to fulfil the wishes of all pro-US European leaders: a strong US 
military commitment in Europe, which led in 1949 to the birth of the 
NATO military alliance within the West block. However, Moscow did 
not issue any direct order to the Czech Communist party, nor offered 
to move its troops towards the Czech border to intimidate the non-
Communists. Thus, at that stage of the mimetic rivalry, hallucinatory 
vision of the reality took already place within the White House. In 
contrast to the West bloc actions, Stalin reciprocally answered with 
the formation of a similar military alliance within the Soviet bloc. Form 
that moment, every events that happened at the international level 
were altered by the hallucinatory logic of rivalry.  
The final steps that led to the establishment of a zero-sum game 
between USSR and US were: a) the Soviets’ acquisition of the atomic 
bomb in 1949, and b) the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communists (Del Pero 
59 If they had managed to take part, the Soviet would pull them out. If Moscow had 
decided to block their participation, it would face the anger of material plight by them. 
60 In 1948, after the coup in Prague, Stalin decided to block the access to that part of 
Berlin under Soviet occupation. A reaction aimed to prevent any further actions by the 
Anglo-American towards a deeper economic and political unification of West Germany. 
















































































Is a new Cold War just a fascination of the media? In fact, it 
seems to be an indisputable fact of contemporary relations between 
Washington and Moscow. Even though the world is no longer divided 
into two spheres of influence, US-Russia relations still have implications 
that go beyond the interests of their respective nations. For example, 
the lack of the Russian support for a UN intervention in Syria, and 
the resulting veto in the Security Council of the United Nations, is 
emblematic. Although its rating has been downgraded by that of a 
super power, Moscow demonstrated that it never buried the rivalry 
that has characterized its relations with the West during the Cold War 
years. Moscow actions are still affected by the perceptions of a threat 
embedded in the of the West liberal order spread. 
According to this paper, the relations between Washington and 
Moscow do not diverge so much from those that characterized the 
Cold War emergence. The Ukraine issue is emblematic in this sense. 
Despite the realists-constructivists debate, to the parties involved, 
Ukraine issue has acquired such a great value that it becomes a symbol 
of the whole relations between Washington and Moscow. However, 
realists and constructivists try to interpret the conflict through the 
altered perceptions of the parties involved. Rationalists cannot grasp 
this alteration because each party always considers its geopolitical 
interests as rational. On the other hand, constructivists cannot grasp 
the influences of the cultural and psychological elements because they 
do not address the psychological dimension of those elements.  
Therefore, the real question that, according to this paper, needs 
to find an answer is why the value of an object, such as Ukraine or 
Crimea, though its poor intrinsic value, begins to acquire greater and 
the meantime, on the Soviet side, as long as Stalin was alive, atomic 
weapons were not integrated into any military doctrine. A constant 
difference seems to emerge between both US and USSR foreign policy. 
The former model of dominion was more aggressive than the second 
one, which primary goal was the USSR domestic security.  
The military escalation of the USSR-US mimetic rivalry occurred 
when Washington decided to intervene in support of the South Korean 
government – authoritarian and pro-Western – against the invasion 
of North Koreans’ – communists and pro-Soviet (Del Pero, 2008: 303). 
Suddenly, Korea was considered a symbol of the struggle for freedom 
in the world. However, before the outbreak of the war, South Korea 
was not considered a vital country whose defines was an American 
strategic priority. It acquired more and more symbolic value because of 
the American belief that behind the North Korean invasion there was a 
Soviet strategic plan to spread its influence in Asia. American point of 
view then was completely altered. Stalin’s real intentions were no longer 
considered as truly important. The logic of mimetic rivalry already 
altered the actors’ reality, as the NSC-68 document proved. At this point, 
then, USSR became the American new scapegoat, and the mechanism 
of violence canalization proved its violent effects. The Soviet threat had 
to be eradicated everywhere. It is due to these perceptions that US 
decided to defend South Korea: a country that had no “intrinsic value”. It 
was for reasons of prestige that US went to war (Del Pero, 2008: 304). 
In summary, the discourse of two countries destined to collide is 
flawed, because it interprets the history using the point of view of 
the actors involved. However, sometimes, this point of view can be 
greatly altered because of particular cognitive and social-psychological 
mechanisms. Moreover, the ideology-lens through which the discourse 
of a violent destiny gained its legitimacy is misleading. It does not help 
to understand why the characteristics of both actors’ foreign policy 
shifted so quickly from cooperation to conflict. In fact, according to this 
paper, ideology is an endogenous product of another phenomenon: 
the mimetic rivalry. The latter begun because of the shift of the 
historical and political condition engendered by the transition from 
FDR’s global international order to Truman’s regional international 
order. In other words, according to this paper, the emergence of a 














































































49Washington and Moscow foreign policies still seem to be driven by a 
hidden mimetic rivalry.  
Finally, despite the evidence that any further consequence over the 
Ukraine are linked to other factors, such as the role of other key players 
– EU, NATO, and China and the domestic political realm within each 
nation. It would be wrongful to think that a possible military escalation 
could be avoided if both states were aware of the economic losses 
related to a long-lasting conflict. The reasons are the following. Firstly, 
because the consequences of a conflict between two rivals cannot be 
analysed like those of any other conflict. It is needful to address the 
psychological and historical baggage produced by the rivalry. Secondly, 
even after WWII, there was a certain awareness of the likely negative 
economic externalities that could provide the end of the cooperation 
with the Soviets. However, that awareness did not stop Truman from 
pursuing far more aggressive and “violent” strategies through its 
foreign policy.
greater symbolic value. Indeed, on the one hand, the West perceives 
the Russian annexation of the Crimea as symbolic attack against the 
foundations of international law as well as the liberal European order; 
it also affects other geopolitical scenarios – Asia, North Africa, and 
Middle East. (Buras et al., 2014). On the other hand, some scholars 
argues that Russian actions can be explained only through the Cold 
War logic, that is, the logic of the spheres of influence. Those would be 
Putin dominant logic, according to Western analysts (Knauer, 2015), 
who has never hidden his concerns for the Western states intervention 
as a symbol of the liberal international order perpetuation the that 
has characterized the US foreign policy during and after the Cold War 
(Salako, 2015). 
According to this paper, however, the debate between realists and 
constructivists is misleading. In fact, if there is no doubt that Ukraine 
has acquired a symbolic value greater than its own intrinsic value. 
On the other hand, it is also true that the actors involved make their 
decisions based on their altered perception of the reality. Thus, even 
though, from their point of view, their actions are rational, this state of 
affairs does not provide any explanations. For this reason, according to 
this paper, the right answer is the third. It is mimetic rivalry, still active 
between the two powers, which has altered their perceptions of the 
reality to the point of considering rational what actually it is not. 
Again, after many years, the ideological opposition between 
Washington and Moscow, in fact, is an endogenous product of their 
mimetic rivalry. A rivalry that has never died, because both the actors 
are still searching for new scapegoats to eliminate in order to fulfil their 
metaphysical desire of dominion. Not surprisingly, the events rapidly 
led to a significant deterioration of their relations. Though the object 
contested has no intrinsic value, it is perceived as vital for the Russian 
security. This altered vision of the reality is a sign that the metaphysical 
desire still drives Russia foreign policy, at least towards the US.  
At the same time, US reaction to the Ukraine issue has been 
significant, as already outlined. Furthermore, White House fears of a 
possible exit of Greece from the Eurozone and the European system 
show that even Greece could become a contended object of the rivalry 
(Mark, 2015; Alexrpt, 2015). Then, since the parallel that seemed to 
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